了解演講稿文體(4篇)

第1篇 了解中國的崛起演講稿

the world is changing with really remarkable speed. if you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these goldman sachs projections suggest that the chinese economy will be almost the same size as the american economy. and if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the chinese economy will be twice the size of the american economy, and the indian economy will be almost the same size as the american economy. and we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the western financial crisis.

a couple of weeks ago, i was looking at the latest projection by bnp paribas for when china will have a larger economy than the united states. goldman sachs projected 2027. the post-crisis projection is 2022. that's just a decade away. china is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. first of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.

and within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country. secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which i think is what china will become -- will be not from the west and from very, very different civilizational roots.

now i know it's a widespread assumption in the west that, as countries modernize, they also westernize. this is an illusion. it's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. it is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. china is not like the west, and it will not become like the west. it will remain in very fundamental respects very different. now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of china? how do we try to understand what china is? and the problem we have in the west at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in western terms, using western ideas. we can't. now i want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what china is like -- just as a beginning.

now what is e_traordinary about this is, what gives china it's sense of being china, what gives the chinese the sense of what it is to be chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the west, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. i'm thinking here, for e_ample, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guan_i, confucian values and so on. these are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. in other words, china, unlike the western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its e_istence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. and there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: of course we know china's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. what we often aren't really aware of is the fact that china is e_tremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. you can't run a place on this scale simply from beijing, even though we think this to be the case. it's never been the case.

so this is china, a civilization state, rather than a nation state. and what does it mean? well i think it has all sorts of profound implications. i'll give you two quick ones. the first is that the most important political value for the chinese is unity, is the maintenance of chinese civilization. you know, 2,000 years ago, europe: breakdown, the fragmentation of the holy roman empire [roman empire]. it divided, and it's remained divided ever since. china, over the same time period, went in e_actly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.

the second is maybe more prosaic, which is hong kong. do you remember the handover of hong kong by britain to china in 1997? you may remember what the chinese constitutional proposition was. one country, two systems. and i'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the west believed them. 'window dressing. when china gets it's hands on hong kong, that won't be the case.' 13 years on, the political and legal system in hong kong is as different now as it was in 1997. we were wrong. why were we wrong? we were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. think of german unification, 1990. what happened? well, basically the east was swallowed by the west. one nation, one system. that is the nation state mentality. but you can't run a country like china, a civilization state, on the basis of one civilization, one system. it doesn't work. so actually the response of china to the question of hong kong -- as it will be to the question of taiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.

now the great advantage of this historical e_perience has been that, without the han, china could never have held together. the han identity has been the cement which has held this country together. the great disadvantage of it is that the han have a very weak conception of cultural difference. they really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. hence their attitude, for e_ample, to the uyghurs and to the tibetans.

or let me give you my third building block, the chinese state. now the relationship between the state and society in china is very different from that in the west. now we in the west overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy. the problem with this proposition is that the chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the chinese than is true with any western state. and the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, i think. and it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the chinese certainly don't have a democracy. and the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in china is given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of chinese civilization, of the civilization state. this is as close as china gets to a kind of spiritual role.

and the second reason is because, whereas in europe and north america, the state's power is continuously challenged -- i mean in the european tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the chinese state has not been challenged. it's had no serious rivals. so you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in china is very different from our e_perience in western history. the result, by the way, is that the chinese have a very different view of the state. whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the chinese don't see the state like that at all. the chinese view the state as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. this is the chinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. it's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the west.

and i would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the chinese conte_t, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past. know that china believes in the market and the state. i mean, adam smith, already writing in the late 18th century said, 'the chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in europe.' and, apart from the mao period, that has remained more-or-less the case ever since. but this is combined with an e_tremely strong and ubiquitous state. the state is everywhere in china. i mean, it's leading firms, many of them are still publicly owned. private firms, however large they are, like lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. targets for the economy and so on are set by the state. and the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas -- as we are familiar with -- with something like the the one-child policy.

moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. i mean, if you want an illustration of this, the great wall is one. but this is another, this is the grand canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century b.c. and was finally completed in the seventh century a.d. it went for 1,114 miles, linking beijing with hangzhou and shanghai. so there's a long history of e_traordinary state infrastructural projects in china, which i suppose helps us to e_plain what we see today, which is something like the three gorges dam and many other e_pressions of state competence within china. so there we have three building blocks for trying to to understand the difference that is china -- the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.

and yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand china by simply drawing on western e_perience, looking at it through western eyes, using western concepts. if you want to know why we unerringly seem to get china wrong -- our predictions about what's going to happen to china are incorrect -- this is the reason. unfortunately i think, i have to say that i think attitude towards china is that of a kind of little westerner mentality. it's kind of arrogant. it's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. and secondly, it's ignorant. we refuse to really address the issue of difference. you know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by paul cohen, the american historian. and paul cohen argues that the west thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. but it's not. in many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the west has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. whereas those cultures -- virtually the rest of the world, in fact -- which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the west, have been thereby forced to understand the west, because of the west's presence in those societies. and therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the west.

i mean, take the question of east asia. east asia: japan, korea, china, etc. -- a third of the world's population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. and i'll tell you now, that east asianers, people from east asia, are far more knowledgeable about the west than the west is about east asia. now this point is very germane, i'm afraid, to the present. because what's happening? back to that chart at the beginning -- the goldman sachs chart. what is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world. we've seen this in terms of the g20 -- usurping very rapidly the position of the g7, or the g8. and there are two consequences of this. first, the west is rapidly losing its influence in the world. there was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago -- copenhagen, climate change conference. europe was not at the final negotiating table. when did that last happen? i would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. and that is what is going to happen in the future.

and the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and e_periences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. and at last, i'm afraid -- take europe, america is slightly different -- but europeans by and large, i have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing. some people -- i've got an english friend in china, and he said, 'the continent is sleepwalking into oblivion.' well, maybe that's true, maybe that's an e_aggeration. but there's another problem which goes along with this -- that europe is increasingly out of touch with the world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. i mean, europe once, of course, once commanded the future in it's confidence. take the 19th century for e_ample. but this, alas, is no longer true.

okay, so how would i like to finish? well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? i think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it. but i want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. for 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. that's what europe and north america represented. the arrival of countries like china and india -- between them 38 percent of the world's population -- and others like indonesia and brazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. civilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. as humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. and we will have to learn about these civilizations.

this big ship here was the one sailed in by zheng he in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the south china sea, the east china sea and across the indian ocean to east africa. the little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, christopher columbus crossed the atlantic. (laughter) or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by zhuzhou in 1368. i think they're playing golf. christ, the chinese even invented golf.

welcome to the future. thank you.

第2篇 了解名人三分鐘演講稿

了解名人三分鐘演講稿篇一

卡米盧

公元前365

古羅馬戰(zhàn)將，政治家。公元前396年起五度出任執(zhí)政官。曾率軍抗擊高盧人入侵，攻克德爾斐城，為擴(kuò)大羅馬疆域，立下顯赫戰(zhàn)功。公元前388年，面對慘遭高盧人劫掠的羅馬城和沸沸揚(yáng)揚(yáng)要求遷徒的民情，卡米盧在元老院發(fā)表了這篇文理交融、聲情并茂的演說。他用天意，用古訓(xùn)，用史實(shí)，用鄉(xiāng)情，用羅馬城的地利，闡述了反對遷徒的理由。一連串的設(shè)間、反問和排比，使演說層層推進(jìn)，產(chǎn)生了不凡的氣勢。結(jié)果，羅馬人決定重建家園，卡米盧因而也被尊為羅馬城的“再生之父”。

反對遷往維愛 公元前388年

同胞們哪!同平民保民官的爭辯對我是如此地痛苦，以至當(dāng)我居住在阿底亞的整個(gè)時(shí)日里，我在痛苦的流放中唯一的慰籍就是我遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)地躲開了這些沖突。如只就這些沖突而論，即使你們用一千道元老院的命令和人民的票決來把我呂還，我也決不回來?，F(xiàn)在我回來了，這不是由于在我這方面改變了主意，而是由于你們的命運(yùn)的變化才迫使我回來的。當(dāng)前的問題是我的祖國究竟是否應(yīng)當(dāng)安然不動(dòng)地留在原地，而不是我是否要不顧任何代價(jià)留在我的祖國。如果我不是在為我的祖國進(jìn)行另一次戰(zhàn)斗，即使現(xiàn)在我也樂于保持沉默，一言不發(fā)。只要一息尚存，不對祖國克盡厥責(zé)，對其他人就是一種恥辱，對卡米盧更是一種莫大罪行。如果當(dāng)現(xiàn)在祖國已經(jīng)光復(fù)時(shí)，我們拋棄了她，那我們?yōu)槭裁匆阉A回來呢?為什么要在她被敵人包圍時(shí)把她從敵人的手中解救出來呢?當(dāng)高盧人獲得勝利并占有了整個(gè)羅馬時(shí)，羅馬的神明和人民仍然堅(jiān)守著神殿和城寨，仍然居住在那里。而現(xiàn)在當(dāng)羅馬人獲得了勝利并收復(fù)了羅馬時(shí)，難道反要放棄城寨和神殿嗎?難道我們的幸遠(yuǎn)要比我們的厄運(yùn)還要使羅馬遭受到更大的荒涼嗎?即使在羅馬城建立時(shí)沒有制定宗教制度且一代一代地相傳下去，但是上大的意旨在此次事變中已經(jīng)如此清楚地顯示出來，最少我個(gè)人相信，一切忽視神圣崇拜的思想都已經(jīng)從人們的生活中排除了。

同胞們哪!當(dāng)你們看到因崇拜或漠視神明而在人事中產(chǎn)生了這樣重大的后果時(shí)，你們還沒理解到，當(dāng)我們還沒有完全由我們從前的罪過和墮落所引起的毀滅中掙脫出來時(shí)，我們是又在策劃著多么深重的罪行嗎?我們的羅馬城是在通過占卜和兆象而顯示出的神的意旨之下建立起來的;羅馬城中沒有一塊地方不滿是宗教的聯(lián)系，沒有一塊地方?jīng)]有一位神明存在;一切正規(guī)的祭祀，正如它們都有指定的日期一樣，也都有指定

的地點(diǎn)。同胞們，你們要拋棄所有這些神——這些由國家崇敬的神和你們在自己的祭壇上供奉的每個(gè)神祗嗎?你們的行為比起光榮的青年蓋約·費(fèi)邊在圍困時(shí)的行為來相去多遠(yuǎn)呢?當(dāng)他從城寨上下來，穿過高盧人的槍林箭雨，在奎里那爾山上舉行了他的家族的規(guī)定的祭祀時(shí)，連敵人都同你們一樣敬佩地注視著他。當(dāng)家族的神圣儀禮甚至在戰(zhàn)爭時(shí)期都不曾間斷，難道你們竟愿意看到在和平時(shí)期放棄國家的宗教禮制和羅馬的神明嗎?難道能讓大司祭們和佛拉門們對他們的公共職能比私人對自己家庭的宗教義務(wù)還要不加重視嗎?

有人可能會回答說，我們可以或者在維愛履行這些義務(wù)，或者派祭司到這里來履行。但是，如果要依禮完成這些儀式。這兩種辦法都急做不到的。不用一-一列舉每個(gè)儀典和神明，我只要問：在朱霹特神的節(jié)日大宴時(shí)，除了在神殿內(nèi)，我們又能在其他什么地方鋪設(shè)他的臥塌呢?①我又何必談起維斯塔神的不滅的神火和安全地保存在她的神廟中的作為我們國統(tǒng)保證的神像呢?②而你，瑪爾斯神哪!和你，父神奎利努啊!又何必談起你們的神盾呢?③你們的愿望是要把所有這些與羅馬同壽的，甚至有些是更古老的神圣之物都拋棄在污瀆的土地上嗎?

祭司們又如何呢?你們難道不了解，這將要犯一種多么重大的罪過嗎?因?yàn)椋S斯塔貞女們一定只有一個(gè)住所，除了羅馬城的陷落，從來沒有任何事物曾使她們離開那里。朱霹特神的佛拉門由神法規(guī)定，不能在羅馬城外留過一宿。你們要使這些神職人員變成維愛的祭司而不再是羅馬的祭司嗎?維斯塔神哪!您的貞女們要拋棄您嗎?佛拉門要因他每夜寄居在外而給他自己和國家?guī)硇碌淖飷簡?想一想我們在正式占卜吉兇后幾乎完全在羅馬境內(nèi)進(jìn)行的其他活動(dòng)吧!對它們，我們是想要如何地棄置不顧和疏忽漠視啊!授予最高統(tǒng)帥權(quán)的庫里亞大會，你們選舉執(zhí)政官和軍政官的百人團(tuán)大會——除了在經(jīng)常召開它們的地點(diǎn)，又能在哪里日開它們并占卜吉兇呢?我們將把這些都遷到維愛去嗎?或者在需要召開大會時(shí)，人們在羅馬城已被神和人拋棄之后再非常不便地到這里來開會嗎?

但你們會說，顯然整個(gè)羅馬是被褻讀了，沒有任何拔除的祭祀能夠使它潔凈，形勢本身迫使我們離開被火摧毀、一切化為廢墟的羅馬，而遷往一切完整的維愛。我們不應(yīng)該建設(shè)羅馬使赤貧的平民為在這里重建家園而受苦。但同胞們啊!我想，不用我說，你們就很明白，這個(gè)說法只是一個(gè)動(dòng)聽的托詞，而不是一個(gè)真正的理由。你們記得，遷往維愛的這同一個(gè)問題是怎樣在高盧人到來前就被提出

過的，而那時(shí)公私建筑和羅馬城都還安然屹立著。并且，保民官們，請你們注意：我的觀點(diǎn)和你們的觀點(diǎn)是多么的不同。你們認(rèn)為，即使在那時(shí)不應(yīng)該搬遷，無論如何現(xiàn)在就應(yīng)該搬遷了，然而——在你們聽懂我要說的意思之前，請不要表示驚訝——我的意見卻是，即使在羅馬完整無缺時(shí)遷徙是對的話，那么，現(xiàn)在我們也不應(yīng)放棄這片廢墟。因?yàn)椋谀菚r(shí)，如果遷往一個(gè)被我們墳陷的城市，其理由在于，對我們自己和我們的子孫后代，這都顯得是光彩的勝利，但現(xiàn)在這種遷徒將是對高盧人的光榮，對我們的羞辱和痛苦。因?yàn)?，我們將被認(rèn)為，不是作為勝利者離開了我們的祖國，而是因?yàn)楸徽鞣У袅俗鎳?。人們會認(rèn)為，這是阿里亞的逃潰，羅馬的失陷和神殿的被圍等等迫使我們拋棄我們的家神，注定我們自己要從我們無力保衛(wèi)的地方流亡出去。難道高盧人能顛覆羅馬，而羅馬人竟不能恢復(fù)羅馬嗎?

難道因?yàn)榻ㄔO(shè)有困難， 你們就準(zhǔn)備容許這個(gè)罪惡和忍受這個(gè)恥辱嗎?如果說，在整個(gè)羅馬城中，不能建起比我們的祖國的建者的茅屋更好更寬敞的住處，難道在我們的神廟和神祗之間，象牧人農(nóng)夫那樣居住在茅屋中，不比作為一個(gè)流亡的民族而迂徙外地更好嗎?我們的祖先——牧人和難民，④在幾年之間就創(chuàng)立了一個(gè)新的城邦，那時(shí)這里除了叢林和沼澤外，別無他物;難道我們竟不管城寨與神殿的依舊完整，各神廟的仍然屹立，而逃避重建被燒毀的建筑的責(zé)任嗎?如果我們的房屋燒了，我們每人會如何為自己來努力呢?現(xiàn)在是羅馬城被燒毀

了，我們作為一個(gè)整體，難道就不想作同樣的努力嗎?

再說，假定或出于惡意，或出于偶然，維愛發(fā)生了大火，而火焰被風(fēng)煽揚(yáng)(這是很可能的)，燒毀了城市的大部，那我們是不是又要去注意腓德耐或蓋比愛，或任何其他你們能想到的城市，作為遷往的地方呢?我們的鄉(xiāng)土，這塊我們稱之為祖國的土地，對我們就只有這樣微弱的吸引力嗎?我們對祖國的熱愛，就只是依戀它的建筑嗎?雖然回憶我的苦難是不愉快的，回億你們不公正的行為是更不愉快的，但我必須向你們承認(rèn)，每當(dāng)我在外地懷念我的祖國時(shí)，所有這一切——山丘、平原、臺伯河、這片對我如此親切的景物、這片我生長于其下的天空——都立刻涌上我的心頭。我深望這一切所激起的眷戀之情現(xiàn)在能夠打動(dòng)你們，使你們留在你們的祖國，而不要在你們放棄她之后，讓這一切引起你們的故國之恩而使你們懷念不已。神和人選定這塊地方作為一個(gè)城邦的所在，不是沒有正當(dāng)?shù)睦碛傻摹＿@里有振奮精神的山丘;有寬闊的河流，通過這

條河流，內(nèi)陸各地的物產(chǎn)可以運(yùn)來，海外各地的貨品也可取得;這里臨近大海，可以獲得海洋所能提供的一切好處，但又不太近海，不致遭受外國艦隊(duì)的威脅;這里又是正位于意大利中心的地區(qū)——總之，這是天然的適合于一個(gè)城邦擴(kuò)展的位置。一個(gè)城邦立國不久，其疆域已如此之大，僅僅這一點(diǎn)，就說明了這個(gè)道理。同胞們，今年是羅馬建城的第365年。然而在你們長期與之作戰(zhàn)的所有那些古老國家中，不必提單獨(dú)的城邦了，只講同愛奎依人相聯(lián)合的伏爾西人以及他們的所有工事堅(jiān)固的城鎮(zhèn)和雄視海陸、橫貫意大利東西海岸的整個(gè)埃特魯里亞——他們在戰(zhàn)爭中都未能成為你們的對手。你們命運(yùn)亨通，迄今一直是如此;又有什么理由叫你們嘗試另一種命運(yùn)呢?打消這種想法吧!即使承認(rèn)你們的勇敢能夠轉(zhuǎn)移到另一個(gè)地方去，這塊土地的好運(yùn)肯定是不會轉(zhuǎn)移過去的。這里有喀必多林山，它是從前曾經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)人頭的所在，這被認(rèn)為是一個(gè)預(yù)兆，預(yù)示這里將是世界首領(lǐng)和最高權(quán)力的所在。就是在這里，當(dāng)喀必多林山由占卜的儀式予以清除時(shí)，朱維塔斯神和德爾米努神⑤不肯被人移動(dòng)，這曾經(jīng)使你們的祖先歡喜不已。維斯塔的神火就在這里;天降的神盾就在這里;所有的神明都在這里，如果你們留下來，他們將向你們降福。

注釋：

①羅馬每年9月13日在朱霹特神殿舉行大祭，朱霹特神像置一臥榻上。

②在維斯塔女神的神廟中由維斯塔貞女維持著國灶中的不滅的神火，它是羅馬公民的象征，是羅馬國統(tǒng)的保證。

③瑪爾斯神和奎利努神都是羅馬的戰(zhàn)神。據(jù)說在羅馬第二王努瑪統(tǒng)治的時(shí)期。由天上降下了戰(zhàn)神的神盾，這被認(rèn)為是羅馬國家永遠(yuǎn)存在的象征，由戰(zhàn)神的祭司們悉心保存。

④傳說羅馬創(chuàng)建者羅慕洛是維斯塔貞女與戰(zhàn)神所生。國王(也是他的叔父)下令處死其母，將羅慕洛擲在臺伯河中，但他未死，并受到牧人的撫養(yǎng)，因此這里說他是牧人和難民。

⑤朱維塔斯神是羅馬神話中的青年文神，有兩個(gè)神廟，一個(gè)神廟在喀必多林山上。德爾米努神是羅馬神話中主管疆界的神，他的形象是一個(gè)人頭，沒有手腳，表示他決不離開他所在的地方，朱霹特神殿中亦有德爾米努神的一個(gè)地位，因此有時(shí)他被解釋為朱霹特神的一種表現(xiàn)。

了解名人三分鐘演講稿篇二

親愛的同學(xué)們大家晚上好! 當(dāng)有人站在這么一個(gè)舞臺上，我們很多同學(xué)都會羨慕。也會想，也許我去講，會比他講的更好。但是不管站在臺上的同學(xué)是面對失敗還是最后的成功，他已經(jīng)站在這個(gè)舞臺上了。而你，還只是一個(gè)旁觀者，這里面的核心元素，不是你能不能演講，不是你有沒有演講才能，而是你敢不敢站在這個(gè)舞臺上來。我們一生有多少事情是因?yàn)槲覀儾桓宜詻]有去做的。

曾經(jīng)有這么一個(gè)男孩，在大學(xué)整整四年沒有談過一次戀愛，沒有參加過一次學(xué)生會班級的干部競選活動(dòng)。這個(gè)男孩是誰呢?他就是我。

在大學(xué)的時(shí)候，難道我不想談戀愛嗎?那為什么沒有呢?因?yàn)槲沂紫染桶炎约嚎幢饬?。我在想，如果我去追一個(gè)女生，這個(gè)女生可能會說，你這頭豬，居然敢追我，真是癩蛤蟆想吃天鵝肉。要真出現(xiàn)這種情況，我除了上吊和挖個(gè)地洞跳進(jìn)去，我還能干什么呢?所以這種害怕阻擋了我所有本來應(yīng)該在大學(xué)發(fā)生的各種感情上的美好。 其實(shí)現(xiàn)在想來，這是一件多么可笑的事情，你怎么知道就沒有喜歡豬的女生呢?就算你被女生拒絕了，那又怎么樣呢?這個(gè)世界會因?yàn)檫@件事情就改變了嗎?那種把自己看得太高的人我們說他狂妄，但是一個(gè)自卑的人，一定比一個(gè)狂妄的人還要更加糟糕。因?yàn)榭裢娜艘苍S還能抓到他生活中本來不是他的機(jī)會，但是自卑的人永遠(yuǎn)會失去本來就屬于他的機(jī)會。因?yàn)樽员?，所以你就會害怕，你害怕失敗，你害怕別人的眼光，你會覺得周圍的人全是抱著諷刺打擊侮辱你的眼神在看你，因此你不敢去做。所以你用一個(gè)本來不應(yīng)該貶低自己的元素貶低自己，使你失去了勇氣，這個(gè)世界上的所有的門，都被關(guān)上了。

當(dāng)我從北大辭職出來以后，作為一個(gè)北大的快要成為教授的老師，馬上換成穿著破軍大衣，拎著漿糊桶，專門到北大里面去貼小廣告的人，我剛開始內(nèi)心充滿了恐懼，我想這可都是我的學(xué)生啊，果不其然學(xué)生就過來了。哎俞老師，你在這貼廣告啊。我說，是，我從北大出去自己辦個(gè)培訓(xùn)班，自己貼廣告。學(xué)生說，俞老師別著急，我來幫你貼，我突然發(fā)現(xiàn)，原來學(xué)生并沒有用一種貶低的眼神在看我，學(xué)生只是說，俞老師我來幫你貼，而且說，我不光幫你貼，我還在這看著，不讓別人給它蓋上。逐漸我就意識到了，這個(gè)世界上，只有你克服了恐懼，不在乎別人的眼光，你才能成長。 也正是有了這樣慢慢不斷增加的勇氣，我有了自己的事業(yè)，有了自己的生活，有了自己的未來。

回過頭來再想一想，最近這幾天正在全世界非?；鸨奈业呐笥阎获R云，他就比我偉大很多。馬云跟我有很多相似之處，當(dāng)然不是長相上相似，大家都知道，這個(gè)長相上還是有差距的，他長得比較有特色。

我們倆都高考考了三年，我考進(jìn)了北大的本科，他考進(jìn)了杭州師范學(xué)院的?？?，大家馬上發(fā)現(xiàn)，從這個(gè)意義上來說，無論如何，我應(yīng)該顯得比他更加的優(yōu)秀。但是一個(gè)人的優(yōu)秀并不是因?yàn)槟憧忌狭吮贝缶蛢?yōu)秀了，并不是因?yàn)槟闵狭斯鹁蛢?yōu)秀了，也并不會因?yàn)槟汩L相好看而優(yōu)秀。一個(gè)人真正優(yōu)秀的特質(zhì)來自于內(nèi)心想要變得更加優(yōu)秀的那種強(qiáng)烈的渴望，和對生命的追求那種火熱的激情。馬云身上這兩條全部存在。 ，

如果說在我們那個(gè)時(shí)候，馬云能成功，李彥宏能成功，馬化騰能成功，俞敏洪能成功，我們這些人都是來自普通家庭，今天的你擁有的資源和信息比我們那個(gè)時(shí)候要更加豐富一百倍，你沒有理由不成功。 當(dāng)我們要有勇氣跨出第一步的時(shí)候，我們首先要克服內(nèi)心的恐懼，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)世界上，只有你往前走的腳步你自己能夠聽見。 所以我希望同學(xué)們能夠認(rèn)真地想一下：我內(nèi)心現(xiàn)在擁有什么樣的恐懼，我內(nèi)心現(xiàn)在擁有什么樣的害怕，我是不是太在意別人的眼光，因?yàn)檫@些東西，我的生命質(zhì)量是不是受到影響，因?yàn)檫@些東西，我不敢邁出我生命的第一步，以至于我生命之路再也走不遠(yuǎn)。如果是這樣的話，請同學(xué)們勇敢地對你們的恐懼和勇敢地對別人的眼神，說一聲no!because i am myself.

了解名人三分鐘演講稿篇三

約公元前495——公元前429

古雅典政治家、戰(zhàn)略家，出身名門，24歲從政，善于思辨。受哲學(xué)家阿那克薩哥拉民主思想的影響，推崇奴隸主民主政治。公元前444年當(dāng)選將軍，連續(xù)20__年執(zhí)掌軍權(quán)，成為雅典的實(shí)際統(tǒng)治者。當(dāng)政期間，對內(nèi)推行和完善奴隸主民主制，廢除任職財(cái)產(chǎn)資格限制，鼓勵(lì)工商業(yè)和文化發(fā)展;對外與波斯言和，加強(qiáng)提洛同盟，維護(hù)雅典海上利益，使雅典進(jìn)入鼎盛時(shí)期，成為“希臘的學(xué)?！?。為稱雄希臘地區(qū)，公元前431年率兵迎戰(zhàn)斯巴達(dá)，史稱“伯羅奔尼撒戰(zhàn)爭”。初期互有勝負(fù)，但戰(zhàn)局發(fā)展對雅典不利。公元前430年在攻訐聲中落選將軍，并被課以巨額罰金。次年再度當(dāng)選。不料瘟疫席卷雅典，染疾而終。本葛是為悼念在伯羅奔尼撒戰(zhàn)爭中陣亡的將士而作，被認(rèn)為是描述雅典奴隸主民主政治的范文。通篇說理縝密，講求詞藻，刻意鋪陳，以繁茂取勝，反映了當(dāng)時(shí)詭辯學(xué)派修辭家的影響。

論雅典之所以偉大 公元前431年

我們?yōu)橛羞@樣的政體而感到喜悅。我們不羨慕鄰國的法律，因?yàn)槲覀兊恼w是其他國家的楷模，而且是雅典的獨(dú)創(chuàng)。我們這個(gè)政體叫做民主政體。

①它不是為少數(shù)人，而是為全

① 即奴隸主民主制。體人民。

②無論能力大小，人人都享有法律所保障的普遍平

② “全體人民”實(shí)際上指奴隸主和自由民，不包括奴隸在內(nèi)。

等，并在成績卓著時(shí)得享功名，擔(dān)任公職的權(quán)利不屬于哪個(gè)家族，而是賢者方可為之。家境貧寒不成其為障礙。無論何人，只要為祖國效力，都可以不受阻礙地從默默無聞到步步榮升。我們可以暢通無阻地從一個(gè)職位走向另一個(gè)職位;我們無所顧忌地共享親密無間的日常生活;我們既不會為鄰人的我行我素而煩惱，也不全面露不豫之色—— 這有傷和氣，卻無補(bǔ)于事。這祥，我們一方面自由而善意地與人交往，另一方面又不敢以任何理由觸犯公益，因?yàn)槲覀冏駨姆ㄍズ头?，特別是那些保護(hù)受害者的法律，以及那些雖未成文，但違反了即為恥辱的法律。另外，為了陶冶身心，我國法律還規(guī)定了十分頻繁的節(jié)假日。賽會和祭祀終年不斷。屆時(shí)美不勝收，蔚為大觀，歡愉的氣氛驅(qū)散了憂郁。我們的雅典如此偉大，致使宇內(nèi)各地的產(chǎn)品云集于此。這些精美產(chǎn)品和國內(nèi)產(chǎn)品一樣，給雅典人帶來了習(xí)以為常的樂趣。我們在軍事政策上也勝過敵人，我們的方針與敵人的方針截然不同。雅典向世界敞開大門。我們并不擔(dān)心敵人會窺得那些從不隱藏的秘密，使我們蒙受損失，也從不以此為由

，把前來尋求進(jìn)步和獵奇的外國人驅(qū)逐出境。比較而言，我們不大依靠戰(zhàn)備和謀略，而是信賴公民們與生俱來的愛國熱忱和行動(dòng)。在教育方面，某些國家的人從小就簧接受嚴(yán)酷的訓(xùn)練，以便在成年后承受辛勞;我們雅典人的生活盡管溫文爾雅，卻能象他們一樣勇敢地面對任何戰(zhàn)爭危險(xiǎn)。在生活方式上，我們既文雅，又簡樸，既培育著哲理，又

不至于削弱思考。我們以樂善好施而非自我吹噓來顯本自己的富有，承認(rèn)貧困并不可恥，無力擺脫貧困才確實(shí)可恥。我們既關(guān)心個(gè)人事務(wù)，又關(guān)心國家大事;即便那些為生活而奔忙的人，也不乏足夠的參政能力。因?yàn)槲í?dú)雅典人才認(rèn)為，不參與國事乃平庸之輩，而不止是懶漢。我們能作出最準(zhǔn)確的判斷，并善于捕捉事情的隱患。我們不認(rèn)為言論會妨礙行動(dòng)，而認(rèn)為在未經(jīng)辯論并充分作好準(zhǔn)備之前，不應(yīng)貿(mào)然行動(dòng)。這是雅典人與眾不同的優(yōu)點(diǎn)：行動(dòng)時(shí)我們勇氣百倍，行動(dòng)前卻要就各項(xiàng)措施的利弊展開辯論。有些人的勇氣來自無知，深息熟慮后卻成了懦夫。毫無疑問，那些深知戰(zhàn)爭的災(zāi)患與和平的甜美，因而能臨危不懼的人，才稱得上具有最偉大的靈魂。我們在行善方面也與眾多的民族不同。我們不是靠接受承諾，而是靠承擔(dān)義務(wù)來維護(hù)友誼。根據(jù)感恩圖報(bào)之常理，施惠人對受惠人擁有優(yōu)勢;后者由于欠了前者的情，不得不扮演比較乏味的角色，他覺得報(bào)答之舉不過是一種償還，而不是一項(xiàng)義務(wù)。只有雅典人才極度樂善好施，但不是出于私利，而是純屬慷慨。綜述未盡之言，我只想加上一句：我們雅典總的來說是希臘的學(xué)校，我們之中的每一個(gè)人都具備了完美的素質(zhì)，都有資格走向沸騰的生活的各個(gè)方面，都有最優(yōu)雅的言行舉止和最迅速的辦事作風(fēng)。

至于你們這些幸存者，你們可以為改善命運(yùn)而祈禱，但也應(yīng)把保持這種英勇抗敵的精神和激情視為己任。不要僅憑高談闊論來判定這樣做的利弊。因?yàn)槊恳粋€(gè)夸夸其談的人，都能把眾所周知的道理和奮勇抗敵的益處訴說一遍。你們要把祖國日益壯大的景象系在心上，并為之著迷。等你們真正領(lǐng)悟到了雅典的偉大，你們再捫心自問，雅典之偉大乃是由那些剛毅不拔，深知己任，在戰(zhàn)斗中時(shí)刻有著榮譽(yù)感的將士們締造的。一但他們的努力不能成功，需要他們以大無畏氣概來報(bào)效祖國，他們不認(rèn)為這是恥辱，因而作出了最崇高的奉獻(xiàn)。他們就這樣為國捐軀了。他們中的每個(gè)人都將千古流芳。他們的陵墓將永放光華，因?yàn)檫@不僅是安葬英靈的墓穴，而且是銘刻英名的豐碑。無論何時(shí)，只要談到榮譽(yù)或?qū)嵺`榮譽(yù)，人們就會提到他們，他們永垂不朽。

第3篇 演講要征服聽眾就要先了解演講者與聽眾

演講要征服聽眾就要先了解演講者與聽眾

下面從兩方面談?wù)勓葜v者與聽眾的關(guān)系及演講者如何征服聽眾。

一、了解和掌握聽眾

為什么要了解和掌握聽眾呢？這是因?yàn)椋?/p>

第一，聽眾是演講活動(dòng)不可缺少的重要方面。演講是演講者與聽眾的雙向交流活動(dòng)。演講者是信息的傳播者，聽眾是信息的接受者。演講者離開了聽眾就失去了對象，演講活動(dòng)就無法進(jìn)行。

第二，了解和掌握聽眾是實(shí)現(xiàn)演講目的的客觀要求。演講的目的是說服聽眾改變態(tài)度并按照演講者的意圖去行動(dòng)。這就要求演講者的意圖去行動(dòng)。這就要求演講者了解聽眾的心理、要求和希望及對你所講觀點(diǎn)的態(tài)度，這樣你才能有的放矢地作好演講。

第三，聽眾在演講活動(dòng)中雖處于客體的地位，但也絕不是被動(dòng)的“接收器”，而是具有主觀能動(dòng)性的積極參與者。如果聽眾對演講內(nèi)容有極大興趣，便會采取積極、熱情的合作態(tài)度；反之，則會采取冷漠甚至敵視的態(tài)度，演講就不會成功，因此，演講者必須在了解聽眾的基礎(chǔ)上力求觸發(fā)聽眾的興奮點(diǎn)和創(chuàng)造欲，才能實(shí)現(xiàn)的最終目的。

可見，成功的演講者既要使演講成為聽眾的一部分，也要使聽眾成為他的演講的一部分，而其中首要的，要便是要了解和掌握聽眾的心理特點(diǎn)?？偟恼f來，聽眾的心理主要有以下四個(gè)特點(diǎn)：

1，聽眾對信息的接受具有選擇性。聽眾聽演講是用聽覺、視覺器官及大腦進(jìn)行認(rèn)識的.一種綜合心理活動(dòng)，它是在已有經(jīng)驗(yàn)、知識和心理期待的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行的，因而具有極強(qiáng)的主觀色彩和選擇性。首先是選擇性注意，即只注意那些他們已知、有興趣、有關(guān)系或渴望了解的部分；其次是選擇性記憶，即容易記住那些自己愿意記住的信息，忘記那些自己不喜歡的信息；再次是選擇性接受，即愿意接受那些與自己一致的觀點(diǎn)。

2，聽眾對演講的態(tài)度受自身的影響。對同一演講者的同一內(nèi)容，聽眾由于受自身態(tài)度的影響采取不同的態(tài)度。

3，聽眾都有特殊的心理需要。每個(gè)聽眾聽演講的心理需要都與切身利益相關(guān)。有希望長知識的，有希望開眼界的，有希望解決實(shí)際總是的等。

4，聽眾心理是獨(dú)立意識與從眾心理的矛盾統(tǒng)一。即是說聽眾心理既有個(gè)個(gè)獨(dú)立思考、不唯上、不唯書的獨(dú)立意識的一面；又有受其他聽眾影響改變自己看法的一面。

二、演講者的威信效應(yīng)

演講者的威信是指演講者在聽眾中享有的聲望與信譽(yù)，這是演講者趨于成熟的重要標(biāo)志。那么，威信效應(yīng)會對聽眾產(chǎn)生哪些積極的心理作用呢？

第一、對聽眾態(tài)度的影響。如果演講者在聽眾中有較高的威信，聽眾往往會由喜愛演講者的人格而喜愛演講者的人格而喜愛演講內(nèi)容；有時(shí)即使演講內(nèi)容他們并不熟悉和有興趣，也易受威信效應(yīng)的影響報(bào)以熱情合作的態(tài)度。

第二、對聽眾認(rèn)知心理的影響。社會心理學(xué)研究表明，人們對于來自權(quán)威方面的信息，一般都易不加分析地加以接受。因?yàn)檠葜v者的威信，聽眾往往會認(rèn)為他的話都是權(quán)威、可信的，這就使演講者宣傳的觀點(diǎn)容易和聽眾相抵觸。

第三、對聽眾情感心理的影響。威信效應(yīng)的最大作用就是對聽眾情感的影響。演講者的威信使聽眾的好奇和期待心理滿足了，他們就會對演講者產(chǎn)生一種歸屬感、親近感，便會帶著興奮的聽演講。

演講者的掌握了以上四個(gè)心理特征的基礎(chǔ)上，便可以從以下幾方面做起，樹立自己在聽眾中的威信。

首先要擺正和聽眾的關(guān)系。要牢記：演講者也是人民的一員，和聽眾在政治地位、人格上是平等的，沒有高低貴賤之分，只是暫時(shí)的社會分工、社會義務(wù)不同，因此，要以平等、謙和的姿態(tài)作演講，既宣傳聽眾，又向聽眾學(xué)習(xí)。

其次要發(fā)揮“名片效應(yīng)”和“自己人效應(yīng)”。所謂“名片效應(yīng)”，就是演講者先申述一種與聽眾觀點(diǎn)相同的觀點(diǎn)，然后再說出演講者想說的觀點(diǎn)，這就很容易被聽眾接受。它可以淡化甚至消除聽眾在一種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)同的喜悅中自動(dòng)解除精神防線。

“自己人效應(yīng)”則比“名片效應(yīng)”更進(jìn)了一層，即演講者與聽眾不僅在觀點(diǎn)上一致，而且有某種意義的相似性，如性別、年齡、籍貫、職業(yè)、地位、經(jīng)歷、興趣等，都會使聽眾產(chǎn)生信任感、親近感，視演講者為“自己人”。有了這些，還愁你的威信樹立不起來嗎

第4篇 演講要征服聽眾要先了解演講者與聽眾

下面從兩方面談?wù)勓葜v者與聽眾的關(guān)系及演講者如何征服聽眾。

一、了解和掌握聽眾

為什么要了解和掌握聽眾呢？這是因?yàn)椋?/p>

第一，聽眾是演講活動(dòng)不可缺少的重要方面。演講是演講者與聽眾的雙向交流活動(dòng)。演講者是信息的傳播者，聽眾是信息的接受者。演講者離開了聽眾就失去了對象，演講活動(dòng)就無法進(jìn)行。

第二，了解和掌握聽眾是實(shí)現(xiàn)演講目的的客觀要求。演講的目的是說服聽眾改變態(tài)度并按照演講者的意圖去行動(dòng)。這就要求演講者的意圖去行動(dòng)。這就要求演講者了解聽眾的心理、要求和希望及對你所講觀點(diǎn)的態(tài)度，這樣你才能有的放矢地作好演講。

第三，聽眾在演講活動(dòng)中雖處于客體的地位，但也絕不是被動(dòng)的“接收器”，而是具有主觀能動(dòng)性的積極參與者。如果聽眾對演講內(nèi)容有極大興趣，便會采取積極、熱情的合作態(tài)度；反之，則會采取冷漠甚至敵視的態(tài)度，演講就不會成功，因此，演講者必須在了解聽眾的基礎(chǔ)上力求觸發(fā)聽眾的興奮點(diǎn)和創(chuàng)造欲，才能實(shí)現(xiàn)的最終目的。

可見，成功的演講者既要使演講成為聽眾的一部分，也要使聽眾成為他的演講的一部分，而其中首要的，要便是要了解和掌握聽眾的心理特點(diǎn)?？偟恼f來，聽眾的心理主要有以下四個(gè)特點(diǎn)：

1，聽眾對信息的接受具有選擇性。聽眾聽演講是用聽覺、視覺器官及大腦進(jìn)行認(rèn)識的一種綜合心理活動(dòng)，它是在已有經(jīng)驗(yàn)、知識和心理期待的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行的，因而具有極強(qiáng)的主觀色彩和選擇性。首先是選擇性注意，即只注意那些他們已知、有興趣、有關(guān)系或渴望了解的部分；其次是選擇性記憶，即容易記住那些自己愿意記住的信息，忘記那些自己不喜歡的信息；再次是選擇性接受，即愿意接受那些與自己一致的觀點(diǎn)。

2，聽眾對演講的態(tài)度受自身的影響。對同一演講者的同一內(nèi)容，聽眾由于受自身態(tài)度的影響采取不同的態(tài)度。

3，聽眾都有特殊的心理需要。每個(gè)聽眾聽演講的心理需要都與切身利益相關(guān)。有希望長知識的，有希望開眼界的，有希望解決實(shí)際總是的等。

4，聽眾心理是獨(dú)立意識與從眾心理的矛盾統(tǒng)一。即是說聽眾心理既有個(gè)個(gè)獨(dú)立思考、不唯上、不唯書的獨(dú)立意識的一面；又有受其他聽眾影響改變自己看法的一面。

了解聽眾的心理需求可通過以下方法：1，通過你的聽眾所在單位的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)；2，通過某一地區(qū)、時(shí)期的社會輿論；3，通過開小型座談會或與聽眾個(gè)別交談；4，通過演講過程中的提問、插話等。

二、演講者的威信效應(yīng)

演講者的威信是指演講者在聽眾中享有的聲望與信譽(yù)，這是演講者趨于成熟的重要標(biāo)志。那么，威信效應(yīng)會對聽眾產(chǎn)生哪些積極的心理作用呢？

第一、對聽眾態(tài)度的影響。如果演講者在聽眾中有較高的威信，聽眾往往會由喜愛演講者的人格而喜愛演講者的人格而喜愛演講內(nèi)容；有時(shí)即使演講內(nèi)容他們并不熟悉和有興趣，也易受威信效應(yīng)的影響報(bào)以熱情合作的態(tài)度。

第二、對聽眾認(rèn)知心理的影響。社會心理學(xué)研究表明，人們對于來自權(quán)威方面的信息，一般都易不加分析地加以接受。因?yàn)檠葜v者的威信，聽眾往往會認(rèn)為他的話都是權(quán)威、可信的，這就使演講者宣傳的觀點(diǎn)容易和聽眾相抵觸。

第三、對聽眾情感心理的影響。威信效應(yīng)的最大作用就是對聽眾情感的影響。演講者的威信使聽眾的好奇和期待心理滿足了，他們就會對演講者產(chǎn)生一種歸屬感、親近感，便會帶著興奮的聽演講。

演講者的掌握了以上四個(gè)心理特征的基礎(chǔ)上，便可以從以下幾方面做起，樹立自己在聽眾中的威信。

首先要擺正和聽眾的關(guān)系。要牢記：演講者也是人民的一員，和聽眾在政治地位、人格上是平等的，沒有高低貴賤之分，只是暫時(shí)的社會分工、社會義務(wù)不同，因此，要以平等、謙和的姿態(tài)作演講，既宣傳聽眾，又向聽眾學(xué)習(xí)。

其次要發(fā)揮“名片效應(yīng)”和“自己人效應(yīng)”。所謂“名片效應(yīng)”，就是演講者先申述一種與聽眾觀點(diǎn)相同的觀點(diǎn)，然后再說出演講者想說的觀點(diǎn)，這就很容易被聽眾接受。它可以淡化甚至消除聽眾在一種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)同的喜悅中自動(dòng)解除精神防線。

“自己人效應(yīng)”則比“名片效應(yīng)”更進(jìn)了一層，即演講者與聽眾不僅在觀點(diǎn)上一致，而且有某種意義的相似性，如性別、年齡、籍貫、職業(yè)、地位、經(jīng)歷、興趣等，都會使聽眾產(chǎn)生信任感、親近感，視演講者為“自己人”。有了這些，還愁你的威信樹立不起來嗎